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Introduction
Money laundering has become an increasing focus of attention during the last
decade. This paper is intended to serve as an introduction for officials of the
Government of Bulgaria to issues and policy choices raised by governmental
efforts to control and prosecute money laundering. Those issues and choices are
relevant to the selection of an approach to money laundering control for Bulgaria
and perhaps also in certain respects to the rebuilding of Bulgaria's general systems
of fiscal administration, banking regulation, and law enforcement.
We have tried, in drafting this paper, to provide what is in effect a commentary
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to the basic international documents about money laundering. It seemed to us
that the best approach was to lay out the considerations that go into money
laundering control without trying to make choices for a nation undergoing funda-
mental change about which we can know only a limited amount.
Even with that objective, we recognize that money laundering is not an easy
issue for lawyers of one country to summarize for lawyers in another country.
Thus, we have adopted a two-tier approach below. The paper begins with a
summary that contains some general observations about underlying legal assump-
tions reflected in almost any anti-money laundering regime.
The paper then proceeds to six more extensive discussions of portions of the
subject. The first proposes a working definition of money laundering, and the
second describes the general legal and administrative issues raised by anti-money
laundering regimes of various kinds. The paper next turns respectively to an
examination of representative enforcement arrangements aimed at money laun-
dering, issues of financial and personal privacy raised by government attempts
to track the movement of potentially illicit funds, and certain "ancillary issues"
that may influence the methods a particular country selects in seeking to deal
with money laundering. Finally, the paper discusses in a preliminary way a
question that we understand is of particular immediate interest to Bulgarian author-
ities, namely, the extent to which counter-money laundering enforcement efforts
can be applied to combat profiteering and theft during the transformation of the
Bulgarian state and economy.
We have at several places identified technical issues without suggesting resolu-
tions for those issues, in line with our view of this paper's appropriate focus.
Even in the sections that describe the particulars of money laundering control,
we have not made a particular point of the technical differences between various
definitions or enforcement arrangements, except where necessary to illuminate the
outlines of different approaches. We do not mean to underestimate the difficulty or
the ultimate need to resolve technical matters, but we do want simply to place
the whole subject in perspective first.
We hope that the approach we have chosen will ultimately stimulate the more
detailed inquiries that will be required to put specific money laundering control
statutes or regulations into place in Bulgaria.
A Note on Assumptions
The reader of this paper will conclude, we think, that there is a well-defined
international consensus on the essentials of money laundering control, but that
the attempts of various nations to implement that consensus differ from one
another. This should not be surprising, in view of the different legal and regulatory
systems onto which money laundering control arrangements must be grafted.
We do think that there are some shared assumptions about general government
and legal systems in most of the national arrangements, and in the international
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documents, that should be understood at the outset. The need for understanding
arises not because the assumptions are controversial, but because they may presup-
pose developments that have not yet taken place fully in Bulgaria.
The first assumption is that property is largely, although not entirely, held in
private hands and may be taken by government only after a judicial or administra-
tive determination, based on a stringent set of procedural and substantive safe-
guards, that laws have been violated or compensation is due to the private property
owner.' The second is that generally government must refrain from interference
in the personal or economic lives of citizens except as strictly authorized by law.
The third is that government action, whether directed against property or the
liberty of citizens, may be taken only after public hearing and observance of the
full set of safeguards sometimes summarized by the phrase "due process of law. "
The fourth assumption is that law enforcement within a free society involves
responsibilities in several different areas. One is enforcement of criminal statutes,
by prosecution, imprisonment, seizure of property, or fine-the so-called police
function. The second is enforcement of regulatory or social rules by "civil
means," that is fines, court orders that certain actions must be taken or may not
be taken, or the withdrawal of regulatory sanction or benefits for activity that
does not comply with the rules set by government. We understand that the concept
of "civil and regulatory enforcement" (for example, the withdrawal of a bank
charter, or the barring of a certain individual from holding a position in a financial
institution) may be somewhat difficult to understand at first, but such enforcement
is, as the reader will see, a key part of any effective money laundering control
system.
Money laundering ultimately entails the use of the lawful commercial system
for unlawful means. Controls of the unlawful uses of a lawful system of course
presuppose that system is in place and, more, that its assumptions, at least as
applied legitimately, are commonly understood and shared by the nation's work
force and managers. For example, money laundering control (and tax administra-
tion generally) depend upon the ability of government to review the records of
commercial operations and to reconstruct transactions; bank supervision depends
on much the same capacity. But the maintenance of records is not a novel operation
taken to satisfy a governmental objective; record-keeping is essential in a commer-
cial society, and the absence of records is more likely than their presence to
indicate unique, and possibly unlawful, circumstances.
For the same reasons, there is likely to be some important relationship between
the level of government controls imposed during the period of the transformation
of society and the efficiency and speed with which that transformation is accom-
1. Of course, governments or government-owned enterprises may also "launder" funds or
hide assets to accomplish or shield illegal activities, and many of the controls described in this paper
must apply equally to government and private transactions. See section IV, below, for additional
observations on application of money laundering control principles to government activity.
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plished. This does not mean that fiscal controls are inconsistent with strong and
enduring economic development; the converse may well be true. It also does not
mean that a developing society can afford to tolerate lawlessness as a basis for
quick economic growth; the experience of a number of nations is clearly to the
contrary. But the balance between enforcement and growth and between the costs
and benefits of specific approaches to fiscal control need to be carefully calibrated
and constantly re-examined.
I. A Working Definition of Money Laundering
Money laundering is fundamentally simple. It involves disguising the existence,
amount, provenance, or ownership of funds and other assets in an attempt to
avoid (i) detection of illegal activity, (ii) evidence of illegal activity, (iii) taxation,
and (iv) restrictions on profitable uses of the proceeds of illegal activity-whether
to fund additional illegal activity or to reinvest the proceeds of illegality in legal
activity.'
At its most basic level, money laundering involves little more than dealing in
the proceeds of stolen or illegally derived property rather than in the property
itself. Accordingly, government attempts to deal with money laundering must
look in two directions at once: at the criminal operators whose activity generates
the proceeds, and at the controlled or independent intermediaries that assist those
operators in placing, that is, in "laundering," their proceeds and profits.
There appears to be a general agreement, among the major multinational groups
that have considered the question, about the core definition of money laundering. 3
That definition has three elements:
9 act-conversion, transfer, or concealment of the true elements of ownership
of property, or acquisition or use of property, or assisting or counseling
such an act;
2. These objectives are of course interrelated; one reason to avoid taxation is to avoid raising
questions about the origin or level of the profits being taxed or providing tax investigators with leads
that go beyond simple tax avoidance to underlying illegality.
3. The basic documents reflecting the leading international efforts to address the problem of
money laundering are (i) the 1988 U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Docs. E/Conf. 82/15 and E/Conf. 82/14 (December 19, 1988) (the
"Vienna Convention"); (ii) the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Eur. Consult. Ass., Doc. No. 141 (November 8, 1990)
(the "Council of Europe Convention"); (iii) the Report of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, April 19, 1990 (the "FATF Report"); (iv) the E.C. Directive on prevention of the use
of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 166) 77
(1991) (the "EC Directive"); (v) the Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected
to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses of the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.
P, AG/doc. 2916/92 rev. 1 (May 23, 1992) (the "OAS Model Regulations"); and (vi) the Statement
of Principles concerning "Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money
laundering" (the "Basle Statement"), adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices in December 1988. This paper can itself be read as a summary, comparison,
and commentary upon the international money laundering regime outlined in those documents.
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" knowledge-that the property is derived from one or more specified types
of underlying criminal activity; and
* objective-to conceal the illicit origin of the property or to assist a person
involved in the underlying criminal activity in evading the consequences of
discovery of the activity.
The FATF Report contains perhaps the most straightforward working defini-
tion. It describes "the process of money laundering conduct or behavior" as
involving:
* the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived
from a criminal offense, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the
illicit origin of the property or assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such an offense or offenses to evade the legal consequences
of his actions;
* the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that
such property is derived from a criminal offense; [and]
* the acquisition, possession, or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt
that such property was derived from a criminal offense or from an act of
participation in such offense.4
The relative uniformity that exists as to the definition of money laundering is
reflected in a general agreement on three related points:
1. "Bank secrecy"-i.e., a nation's financial privacy laws-should not be
drafted or interpreted as aper se bar to implementation of a nation's attempts
to deal with money laundering.
2. Any attempt to control money laundering must include a set of rules permit-
ting, and indeed requiring, the forfeiture to the government of funds and
other assets found to have been laundered or to have been "derived" from
5laundering.
3. Money laundering is an international problem that requires states to act in
concert both in designing rules to control the movement of illegally-derived
4. FATF Report, Section II(B) (National Programs). See also Vienna Convention, Article 3,
sections l(b) and 1(c); Council of Europe Convention, Article 6, section 1; EC Directive, Article
1; and OAS Model Regulations, Article 2, Paragraphs I through 4. The FATF Report notes a
disagreement as to whether the last of the three elements of the definition is part of the money
laundering offense or involves more generally "an economic aspect of crime which must be addressed
in any comprehensive scheme against money laundering." The FATF comment reflects the fact that
legislative definitions of money laundering have extended the concept beyond what might be termed
its historical or popular meaning. Id. at n. 1. The same issues would naturally arise, in stark relief,
if one attempted to apply money laundering concepts to the unlawful diversion of assets from govern-
ment or previously government-owned enterprises in the course of privatization of the Bulgarian
economy.
5. Naturally, individual national forfeiture systems vary with respect to such matters as the
burden of proof required to be carried by government authorities to secure such forfeiture, and most
systems contain rules protecting the rights of innocent third parties with interests in the subject
property.
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assets and in conducting or assisting in the conduct of particular investiga-
tions.
Two other perspectives are also useful. Law enforcement authorities look at
the issue from a functional perspective. Their typology treats the process of
money laundering as involving essentially three operations (any one or more of
which would be criminalized under the more technical definition). The first is
the placement of criminal proceeds into the legitimate financial system in a way
that minimizes notice, attribution, or detection. The second is the layering of
proceeds in a manner that disguises their origin and true ownership. The third
is the integration of the proceeds into the channels of legitimate commerce.
6
A third perspective from which to view money laundering is that of the financial
institutions whose use-whether unwitting or otherwise-is essential for the
movement of illegal funds. Regulatory attempts to control money laundering,
by their very nature, require a balancing of the interests and claims of government
authorities with those of the private financial sector and its customers.'
Legal and Administrative Issues
The relative uniformity of opinion as to both the general definition of money
laundering and the general elements of a money laundering control system is
only partially helpful. A great many choices must be made in order to build and
administer specific arrangements derived from the definitions.
At least three overlapping sets of issues arise in the creation of any specific
money laundering control regime. These involve, respectively, (i) the scope of
the money laundering offense, (ii) the responsibilities of the financial community
(including the recording and reporting of financial transactions), and (iii) the
extent to which enforcement is based on prosecution and the allocation of responsi-
6. The FATF Report emphasizes the importance of such a perspective in creating practical
money laundering control arrangements:
All these techniques [that is whether they make use of smuggling, offshore shell companies, currency transfers,
and so on] . . . involve going through stages where detection is possible. Either cash has to be exported over a
territorial frontier and then deposited in a foreign financial institution, or it requires the knowing or unknowing
complicity of someone at home not connected with the drug trade [or other underlying crime], or it requires
convincing a domestic financial institution that a large cash deposit or purchase ofa cashier's cheque is legitimate.
Once these hurdles have been cleared, the way is much easier inside the legitimate financial system.
Hence, key stages for the detection of money laundering operations are those where cash enters into the domestic
financial system, either formally or informally, where it is sent abroad to be integrated into the financial systems
of regulatory havens, and where it is repatriated in the form of transfers of legitimate appearance.
FATF Report, Section I(B) (Methods), final two paragraphs. (Emphasis in original.)
7. Deputy Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury John E. Robson's statement
at the time of issuance of the FATF Report is instructive: "The [FATF] Task Force recognized that
money laundering is a complex economic crime that cannot be effectively attacked by conventional
law enforcement methods alone. Law enforcement authorities, finance ministries, financial institution
regulators, and financial institutions themselves must work as partners to prevent financial institutions
from being used by money launderers. ... Statement of Hon. John E. Robson, Treasury News,
April 19, 1990, at 2. In theory, money laundering is criminal financial intermediation, and its
regulation or control is no simpler-is in fact far more complicated-than the regulation or control
of legitimate intermediation.
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bility as between government and financial institutions-and hence between the
police, financial regulators, and private firms and individuals-under particular
arrangements.
II. Scope of the Money Laundering Offense
1. PREDICATE OFFENSES
The most basic question is the selection of the underlying illegal activities to
which money laundering rules apply. 8 The primary candidate, of course, is narcot-
ics trafficking. The Vienna Convention, which Bulgaria has signed and ratified,
requires its signatories to adopt measures necessary to criminalize money laun-
dering for assets derived from narcotics trafficking. 9
The Council of Europe Convention, however, simply calls for steps to establish
laundering of proceeds generated from "predicate offenses," 10 and the OAS
Model Regulations take a similar tack, at Article 2 and Article 1, section 4. The
EC Directive defines "criminal activity" to include the narcotics offenses in the
Vienna Convention, plus "any other criminal activity designated as such for the
purposes of [the] Directive by each Member State."'"
There is increasing agreement that money laundering need not, and should
not, be limited to narcotics offenses. There is less agreement on the nature of
the other crimes that are appropriate "predicate offenses" under the core defini-
tion. The FATF Report suggests several approaches for broadening the definition.
The first is to extend the offense "to any other crimes for which there is a
link to narcotics." The alternative approaches involve "criminaliz[ing] money
laundering based on all serious offenses, and/or on all offenses that generate a
significant amount of proceeds, or on certain serious offenses."
1 2
Several factors appear relevant to the designation of particular offenses as
money laundering predicate offenses. The first is whether the crimes generate
significant or untoward sums of cash. The second is whether the crimes are
somehow associated with narcotics trafficking. The third is whether the crimes
involve serious breaches of international order and require large money trans-
fers-arms trafficking and terrorism come immediately to mind. The fourth is
the extent to which the crimes are associated with organized criminal enterprises
8. There is nothing inherently criminal about many of the steps or transactions involved in the
process of laundering money, unless those steps are linked to knowledge or an intent to further
criminal activity. This proposition is not true, of course, when the steps a money launderer takes
include, for example, falsification of import or export documents, perjury in completion of government
documents, and bank or tax fraud.
9. See Vienna Convention, Article 3, sections l(a) and (b).
10. See Chapter 1, Articles 1(e) and 6.
11. EC Directive, Article 1.
12. FATF Report, Section III(B) (Recommendation 5 and accompanying text).
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or activities. The fifth is whether the offenses strike seriously at the credibility
of banking and other financial institutions."
Among the nations that have either passed or proposed legislation criminalizing
money laundering, these issues have been resolved in various ways. For example,
the United Kingdom has made both narcotics trafficking and terrorism predicate
offenses for money laundering. In Italy, money laundering is currently a crime
only if the predicate offense is aggravated robbery, aggravated extortion, or
kidnapping; pending legislation would add narcotics trafficking and organized
crime association to Italy's list of predicate offenses. The United States specifies
several types of unlawful activity, in addition to narcotics production and traffick-
ing, as predicates for money laundering, including, most importantly, "racke-
teering, '4 bribery, counterfeiting, securities fraud, bank and customs fraud,
smuggling, espionage, kidnapping, mail and wire fraud, and various environmen-
tal crimes. 5
Although the conversion of large amounts of undocumented currency into bank
deposits and other assets is a key component of money laundering, especially in
connection with narcotics, money laundering is in no way limited to conduct
involving cash. Conversely, many methods of dealing with the cash proceeds of
crime have more in common with the most traditional of offenses, smuggling,
than with modern money laundering schemes.
16
Special attention must also be given to the relationship between money laun-
dering and income tax fraud.' 7 Money laundering statutes are no substitute, or
at best only an imperfect substitute, for tax fraud statutes, even though many of
the techniques used by money launderers were developed in part and are still
used simply to evade taxes on income derived from lawful activity. A useful
point of demarcation, reflected in United States legislation, is thus the nature of
the income sought to be hidden. If the income is itself derived from lawful activity
(running a factory, selling wheat, painting homes), steps taken to hide or disguise
it are generally thought to be matters of tax fraud rather than money laundering;
13. There is a definite, if oblique, relationship between the nature of the offenses designated
and the ease or difficulty of proof of knowledge and criminal intent on the part of the money laundering
intermediary, as discussed below. Thus, a standard of imputed intent is easier to understand and
apply in the case of acceptance for deposit of anomalous amounts of currency than in the case of
non-cash transactions involving a superficially legitimate enterprise.
14. "Racketeering activity" is itself independently defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1961 to include
acts or threats involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing
in obscene matter, dealing in narcotics, and other crimes.
15. See 18 U.S.C. section 1956(c)(7) (1992).
16. A money laundering statute need not in any event be the sole basis for criminal prosecutions
of conduct involved in money laundering. Thus, while money laundering statutes are not a substitute
for tax fraud statutes, the latter may be used against illegitimate as well as legitimately derived
income.
17. In this context, "tax fraud" is used simply to denote intentional conduct intended to evade
lawful tax payment obligations; whether such conduct technically constitutes fraud depends upon
the system of tax administration and the general legal concepts of the country in question.
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anti-money laundering regimes tend to concentrate on steps taken to hide or
transmute income derived from illegal sources.
The decision to criminalize misuse of the financial system is by no means the
sole approach to the problems of fiscal order (or rather disorder) that money
laundering reveals. As already noted, an effective approach to money laundering
requires cooperation between the public and private sectors, together with a
mutual understanding by each of the other's perspectives and problems in dealing
with suspect transactions. A crucial question is thus the extent to which reliance
is placed on criminalization (and hence individual investigation and prosecution),
rather than on administrative supervision and examination, to staunch the flow
of illegal funds."s There is a continuing tension between the demands of an ap-
proach based on punishing conduct and concerns for protecting the integrity and
soundness of the financial system of the nation concerned. The question whether
a punishment-based approach is the most efficient way to protect a given financial
system is a continuing one that is perhaps not capable of a single answer.
2. PROBLEMS OF SCIENTER
Even the most limited money laundering statute must address issues of knowl-
edge. The government must prove (or in some systems perhaps the defendant must
disprove) knowledge that the property in question is derived from the specified
predicate offense. But proof is also required that the investigated transactions
concealed the true ownership of the property involved and were carried out to
assist in a criminal enterprise.' 9
Concepts of what a common lawyer might call "scienter," or the "know-
ingness" to be attributed to conduct (and, in the case of proof, to be inferred
from that conduct), can be very complex when applied to the paraphernalia
of nominee accounts, bearer securities, false names, offshore companies, front
organizations, and financial or commercial intermediaries acting at some remove
from the immediate criminal conspiracy, that are the staples of complicated money
laundering schemes. And it is just at that juncture that problems of proof become
the most difficult-whether in a common or civil law system.2 °
Methods of proof are the province of individual legal systems to a great degree,
18. As discussed in more detail below, this is a crucial area in which the way a nation deals
with money laundering both depends upon and reflects the general structure of its legal and financial
systems, and, ultimately, of its political economy.
19. A quote from an old legal dictionary makes the point:
A man may do many acts which are justifiable or not, according as he is ignorant or not ignorant of certain facts.
He may pass a counterfeit coin, when he is ignorant of its being counterfeit, and is guilty of no offense; but if
he knew the coin to be counterfeit, which is called the scienter. he is guilty of passing counterfeit money.
II Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle Revision (1914) 3013. (Emphasis in original.)
20. The necessity for judicially acceptable proof of criminal conduct is one of the mainstays of
due process and is crucial for both the evenhanded administration of justice and the imposition of
severe criminal sanctions. But this fact makes sole reliance on criminalization a less than totally
effective method of dealing with the issues of fiscal regulation that money laundering creates.
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but there is a developing consensus that the effectiveness of criminalization as
a meaningful sanction requires the ability for inferential proof. The Vienna Con-
vention provides that "[k]nowledge, intent or purpose required as an element
of [any of its] offence[s] may be inferred from objective factual circumstances,""'
and the EC Directive adopts virtually identical language in its definition of money
laundering. 2  The OAS Model Regulations do the same. 3
As the interaction between criminal justice and regulatory systems for dealing
with money laundering increases, suggestions have been made that the standard
for criminal liability be extended. The FATF Report noted that some of the
FATF delegates would have expanded the Vienna Convention approach to treat
as criminal situations in which a money launderer "should have known the crimi-
nal origin of the laundered funds," while "a few countries would impose criminal
sanctions for negligent money laundering activities." 2" Some nations have indi-
cated more willingness to use a "willful blindness" standard in connection with
narcotics money laundering than in connection with certain purely financial of-
fenses.
Other approaches to problems of proof are also possible. The United States,
for example, requires ultimate objective proof that laundered funds were in fact
derived from a "specified unlawful activity," but necessitates proof with respect
to the launderer's knowledge, only that the launderer knew the funds were derived
from some unlawful activity.
3. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Because most significant financial intermediation is carried on in corporate
form in developed countries, attempts to criminalize money laundering raise the
corollary issue whether a corporation can or should be criminally or financially
liable for acts of its employees, and if so, the standard of imputed liability to be
applied. The FATF Report's Recommendation 7 approaches the issue gingerly,
by stating that "where possible, corporations themselves-not only their employ-
ees-should be subject to criminal liability."25
The extent to which enterprise liability can be imposed for money laundering,
currency reporting, or export or similar violations normally reflects a national
legal system's general rules about the liability of a corporation (or any other
enterprise) for the acts of its employees and agents. Such liability derives from
general principles about the nature of a corporation, but it is by no means unlim-
21. See Article 3, section 3.
22. See Article 1.
23. See Article 2, Section 5.
24. See FATF Report, Section Il(B) (Recommendation 6).
25. See Section Ill(B).
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ited.26 Again, the nature of the predicate offense for money laundering becomes
a crucial factor. Thus, laundering of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking espe-
cially has been recognized as a particularly appropriate case for enterprise liability
(making it easier for a corporation to itself be found criminally liable for acts
of its employees in moving funds through the corporation's accounts or using
the corporation's banking facilities), even if such imposition created a stricter
standard of liability in such a case than the degree of enterprise liability that
might be applied in cases of other criminal violations.
4. DEFENSES BASED ON OTHER OBLIGATIONS
While bank secrecy has been rejected as a per se defense to money laundering,
other obligations may be sought to be interposed against the money laundering
prohibition. Consider the situation of a lawyer who advises a client, in advance
of a proposed transaction, about cash reporting rules or standards of knowledge
required to be proved to establish criminal conduct. Is the lawyer potentially
counseling or abetting money laundering? What about an accountant or financial
advisor who, in arranging what could be a normal commercial transaction, con-
sciously fails to ask certain questions as part of his work? Must the advisor obtain
independent documentation of the source of the funds involved in the transaction?
These issues are more than simple questions of proof or liability in nations in
which professional obligations-such as the right to effective representation and
the duty to protect the confidentiality of attorney-client consultations-are them-
selves written into law.
The FATF has noted with special concern the problems raised by the role of
unscrupulous lawyers:
[T]hroughout the world there are certain lawyers that specialize in exploiting the secrecy
laws of various countries to obscure the identity and the transactions of their clients,
often to cover illegal activity, including money laundering. They frequently act as
nominees for illegal entities so that the true identity of the beneficial owner can be
shielded from law enforcement scrutiny. If illegal activity is detected, these lawyers avail
themselves of the double-edged sword of financial institution secrecy and attorney-client
privilege to prevent authorities from investigating the client's activities."
26. In Anglo-American corporate law, a corporation is a separate legal person but can only act
through its employees or other agents. The converse to the proposition that the act of an agent-
say, in signing a contract to deliver goods-binds the corporation is that the corporation can be liable
for the harm caused by [an] agent as a result of activities-for example, driving a delivery van-
within the scope of his or her employment. In the case of violation of criminal law, however,
imputation of liability depends upon whether the corporation itself is sufficiently linked to the criminal
activity to support a finding that the corporation possessed the intent to commit a crime.
27. FATF Annual Report, 1991-1992 (June 25, 1992), paragraph 66. The FATF's Working
Group I (Legal) goes into still greater detail:
Money launderers and their clients are increasingly relying on these attorneys to assist them in their criminal
ventures. In some instances attorneys are used to establish shell corporations through which monies can be laundered,
while in other instances, monies are actually being laundered through attorney-client trust accounts.
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Il1. Responsibilities of the Financial Community
There is common agreement that any attempt to control money laundering
must include active assumption of responsibility, within certain limits, by the
financial community itself.28 The agreement is reflected in the Statement of Princi-
ples concerning "Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose
of money-laundering" (the "Basle Statement") adopted by the Basle Committee
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices in December 1988.29 The
Basle Statement, which is reflected in turn in the FATF Report as well as the
EC Directive, emphasizes three sets of responsibilities:
* No system of preventing abuse of banks can hope to function unless banks
understand the true identity of the persons with whom they are dealing and
the beneficial owners of their deposits;
* Banks should avoid knowingly lending their offices to money laundering;
and
* Banks must cooperate actively with law enforcement authorities.3 °
1. CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION
The Basle Statement asks banks to "make reasonable efforts to determine the
true identity of all customers[,] ... institute effective procedures for obtaining
identification from new customers[,] ... [and adopt] an explicit policy that
significant business transactions will not be conducted with customers who fail
The group agreed that the fact that a person acting as a financial advisor or nominee is an attorney should not
in and of itself be sufficient reason for such a person to be able to invoke an attorney-client privilege. Moreover,
in order to ensure that false claims of attorney-client privilege are not being used to afford protection to money
launderers and/or to obstruct money laundering investigations, competent authorities should examine carefully
the validity of any claim by attorneys of such privilege. The attorney-client privilege must be pierced where the
privilege has been falsely asserted to shield criminal activities of money launderers.
See Interpretive Note, Final Report of Working Group I (Legal), Financial Action Task Force 3,
1991-92, printed in Annexes to FATF Annual Report, 1991-1992, page 4.
28. See Recommendation No. R(80)10, "Measures against the transfer and safeguarding of funds
of criminal origin," adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (June 27,
1980). The financial community for this purpose includes both banks and other types of financial
intermediaries, but the most attention has been paid to banks, both because of their historic role and
because the general structure of banking makes that industry somewhat more amenable to cohesive
action and supervision than less well-defined financial industries. The special problems raised by
attempts to apply the principles discussed in this section of the paper to non-bank institutions are
discussed in section IV(4), below.
29. The Basle Committee is composed of representatives of the central banks and supervisory
authorities of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
30. The Basle Statement was described by the Committee as "a general statement of ethical
principles," and was designed, in the words of the Statement, at Section I:
to reinforce existing best practices among banks and, specifically, to encourage vigilance against criminal use of
the payments system, implementation by banks of effective preventive safeguards, and co-operation with law
enforcement agencies.
The Preamble to the Statement explains the Committee's view that "the first and most important
safeguard against money-laundering is the integrity of banks' own managements and their vigilant
determination to prevent their institutions becoming associated with criminals or being used as a
channel for money-laundering."
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to provide evidence of their identity," recognizing that failure to obtain such
information will thwart an institution's own efforts to prevent use of its facilities
for criminal purposes and reduce the effectiveness of any cooperation it offers
police authorities. 3 The FATF Report takes the same basic position in its Recom-
mendations 12 and 13, which would (i) proscribe "anonymous accounts or ac-
counts in obviously fictitious names," (ii) require recorded identification of both
regular and casual customers on the basis of reliable documents of identity, and
(iii) ask financial institutions to "take reasonable measures" to obtain information
about the true identity of the person for whom their ostensible customer is acting.32
The EC Directive adopts a somewhat more targeted approach, as befits its
mandatory character, requiring identification of customers (other than other finan-
cial and credit institutions or in the case of certain interbank transactions for
customers) with whom an institution enters into "business relations" or casual
customers in a transaction (or apparently linked series of transactions) that
amounts to at least ECU 15,000, or for which (at whatever amount) "there is
suspicion of money laundering." The obligation extends to "reasonable mea-
sures" to ascertain the identity of real parties in interest in the case of "doubt"
or certainty that the ostensible customers are not acting on their own behalf.
33
Problems of identification obviously become especially knotty in the case of
customers acting through attorneys or in the case of transactions of an ostensibly
fiduciary nature conducted for unnamed beneficiaries. 34
2. GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
The Basle Statement, at Section III, specifically calls for banks not to "set
out to offer services or provide active assistance in transactions which they have
good reason to suppose are associated with money-laundering activities." The
Statement acknowledges the difficulties a bank may have in "knowing whether
a transaction stems from . . . criminal activity," and accordingly affirms the
importance of communication to and training of bank staff in matters covered
by the Statement. The FATF Report's Recommendation 15 suggests that banks
must "pay special attention to all complex, unusual, large transactions, and all
31. See Section II.
32. See FATF Report, Section III(C)(2). Recommendation 13 cites the special need for care in
dealing with "institutions, corporations, foundations, trusts, etc., that do not conduct any commercial
or manufacturing business or any other form of commercial operation in the country where their
registered office is located."
33. See EC Directive, Article 3, sections 1, 2 and 5. See also OAS Model Regulations, Article
10 (Identification of Clients and Maintenance of Records).
34. For example, the FATF's Working Group II (Financial Matters) has noted problems raised
for customer identification principles by so-called omnibus or trust accounts, that is bank accounts
holding securities managed by an intermediary (for instance a securities broker, investment manager,
or attorney) in which funds of different clients are commingled. See Report to the FATF from
Working Group II, 1991-92, reprinted at Annexes to FATF Annual Report, 1991-92, at 10.
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unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible
lawful purpose." 35
3. COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
Section IV of the Basle Statement calls for banks to avoid assisting customers
who wish to deceive law enforcement authorities "through the provision of al-
tered, incomplete or misleading information." The Statement provides that a
bank is to take "appropriate measures, consistent with law" to deny assistance
and sever relations with customers if the bank is aware of facts "which lead to
the reasonable presumption that money held on deposit is derived from criminal
activity" or that requested transactions are "themselves criminal in purpose."
It is at this point that the relationship between public and private activity is
clearly joined. The Basle Statement itself recognizes, at Section IV, that coopera-
tion can only occur "to the extent permitted by specific local regulations relating
to customer confidentiality." And both the FATF Report and the EC Directive
translate the principle of cooperation into steps that depend not simply on private
action, but on the legislative and administrative framework for relationships be-
tween private institutions and government in this context. The paper now turns
to that subject.
IV. Relationship Between Government and Private Institutions
Relationships between government authorities and private institutions created
in the attempt to prevent and punish money laundering tend to be distinguished
from one another by the extent to which governments require certain kinds of
record-keeping, reporting, or both, by financial institutions, and by the conse-
quences of compliance or noncompliance with such rules. But the way the relation-
ships are worked out illustrates the extent to which a government chooses to rely
on criminalization and prosecution or administrative regulation to control illicit
36transactions.
The relationships tend to have three components:
* Mandatory bank record-keeping;
* Reporting to the government of suspicious transactions; and
" Reporting of all transactions of a certain type or above a certain size.
35. See Section III(C)(3). The EC Directive states the point a bit more narrowly, requiring
financial institutions to "examine with special attention any transaction which they regard as particu-
larly likely, by its nature, to be related to money laundering." See EC Directive, Article 5.
36. The emphasis in this portion of the paper on prosecution and regulation does not gainsay
the importance, and potential efficacy, of voluntary action by associations of financial institutions
or individual institutions to bar access by criminals or their agents to the financial system. The steps
noted in the Basle Statement, and the fact of the Basle Statement, are good examples, as are "guidance
notes" issued for bankers in the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Some commentators have noted
that the risk of public opprobrium or negative publicity may influence bankers to avoid questionable
conduct as effectively as threats of government action.
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The first two components are more or less standard; the third is somewhat
less universally accepted.
1. MANDATORY RECORD-KEEPING
The effectiveness of money laundering investigations and prosecutions depends
upon the ability of authorities to reconstruct financial transactions. That depends,
in turn, upon the existence and maintenance of banking and other records from
which such transactions can be reconstructed. The Basle Statement's insistence,
at Section V, that banks should "implement specific procedures. . . for retaining
internal records of transactions" in order to promote the Statement's principles,
is the natural corollary to the general agreement about the necessity for limitations
on total bank secrecy; a bank that maintains no records or incomplete records
is as secret as a bank that maintains perfect records but refuses to reveal them.
Either way, the investigator is stymied.
The FATF Report states the general objectives to be sought from private sector
record-keeping in this area, calling for the maintenance of:
all necessary records on transactions, both domestic and international, to enable [banks]
to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records
must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the
amounts and types of currency involved, if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence
for prosecution of criminal behavior.37
The recommendation also extends to account records, business correspon-
dence, and records of customer identification. The required retention period is
"at least five years after the account is closed." 3" Article 4 of the EC Directive
takes the same approach. 39 The United States, which has a highly developed set
of rules for customer accounts, specifies in legislation and regulations, with some
degree of precision, the records that banks are required to maintain.4°
37. FATF Report, Section III(B)(2) (Recommendation 14).
38. Id.
39. The terms of the EC Directive are slightly different, calling for the retention, "in the case
of transactions," of "the supporting evidence and records .... " It is unclear whether the different
formulations would require different record retention in practice.
40. See generally 31 C.F.R. Part 103. The U.S. record-keeping provision has essentially
two elements: (1) the "know your customer" requirement, and (2) comprehensive record-keeping.
Under the former, a financial institution must record the customer's taxpayer identification number
and certain other information with respect to each certificate of deposit sold or redeemed, and
each deposit or share account opened, within thirty days after the transaction or the opening of
the account. Under the latter, each financial institution must retain copies of a number of specified
items and documents relating to its accounts. The required copies, which may be stored on
microfilm, microfiche, or other retention technique, generally include copies of each check,
clean draft, or money order for an amount of more than $100 drawn on the financial institution
or issued and payable by it. Even with such a highly developed system, regulators must keep
pace with changes in the financial system, and a current issue under debate in the United States
is the extent to which the record-keeping regime is to be extended to domestic and international
wire-transfer transactions.
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The requirement that banks maintain records, whatever its details, is no more
than that. The manner and extent to which information from those records is
made available to a country's investigators, prosecutors, and regulators depends
upon the country's rules as to criminal and investigative procedure and financial
privacy, discussed below. But the record-keeping requirement has significant
efficacy in and of itself, aside from its function of keeping records available to
permit the planning of law enforcement investigations. A record-keeping regime
necessarily re-enforces and indeed implements the obligation that a bank "know
its customers" and decline to participate in suspect transactions. Such a regime
creates a basis for a bank's internal compliance programs. Finally, mandatory
transaction record keeping creates a structure for bank examinations in the event
that concerns are raised about the relationship between a bank's possible unlawful
activities and its safety and soundness.
2. REPORTING OF TRANSACTIONS
The most difficult aspect of the relationship between banks or other financial
institutions and government in connection with money laundering control involves
the degree to which banks are required to report transactions to government
authorities. There is general agreement, we believe, that reporting at some level
is a key aspect of any system of money laundering control, but its terms and
consequences can vary and require careful consideration. The crucial variables are
whether reporting by banks is voluntary or mandatory and whether the reporting
involves only transactions suspected of involving criminal activity or extends as
well to transactions in a given medium, most importantly cash, above a certain
threshold. A key factor in determining the usefulness (and to some degree the
acceptability of reporting in the financial community) is the capacity (both actual
and perceived) and willingness of government authorities to use the information
reported.
(a) Reporting of Suspicious Transactions
The first level of interest is the reporting by institutions of transactions that they
regard as suspicious, that is, as potentially involving attempts at the movement of
funds derived from criminal activity. The FATF Report recommends succinctly
that:
If financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity, they should be
permitted or required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.4
2
41. This assumes, reasonably, that any financial privacy regime contains an exception for bank
examination by regulatory authorities concerned with a bank's soundness and compliance with banking
laws. Referrals of the details of specific transactions by bank examiners to criminal investigators
may raise separate issues of financial privacy.
42. FATF Report, Section III(B)(3) (Recommendation 16).
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The EC Directive calls for member states to:
ensure that credit and financial institutions and their directors and employees cooperate
fully with the authorities responsible for combating money laundering. . . by [in part]
informing those authorities, on their own initiative, of any fact which might be an
indication of money laundering. 43
The OAS Model Regulations require reporting to competent authorities of
transactions "that . . . could constitute or be related to illicit activities." OAS
Model Regulations, Article 13, section 2. 44
(b) When to Report
Any reporting scheme that requires the identification of "suspicious transac-
tions" raises many issues, of which the clearest are what gets reported, when,
and how. Asking banks to identify transactions they regard as suspicious re-
emphasizes the need, recognized by all the commentators and noted above, for
comprehensive training of bank employees to recognize suspect transactions or
relationships.45 Similarly, recognition and reporting must be contemporaneous
with transactions to do the most good for law enforcement officials.
Finally, any reporting scheme places responsibilities upon authorities that are
in some ways as important as the responsibilities placed upon banking officials.
Attention must be given to the manner in which reported information will be
distributed among government authorities charged with enforcement responsibili-
ties-consistent with the limitations that financial privacy rules place upon use
of the information, also discussed below.
(c) Voluntary and Mandatory Reporting
The decision whether reporting of suspicious transactions should be voluntary
or mandatory is a complex one. The FATF Report notes simply the existence
of "a divergence of opinion within the Task Force" on the question, with "[a]
few countries strongly believ[ing] that this reporting should be mandatory...
with administrative sanctions available for failure to report."46 Of course, in a
nation that has criminalized money laundering, even a voluntary system is not
43. EC Directive, Article 6.
44. The reporting requirement is linked to the provision of the Model Regulations that institutions
"shall pay special attention to all complex, unusual or large transactions, whether completed or not,
and to all unusual patterns of transactions, and to insignificant but periodic transactions, which have
no apparent economic or lawful purpose." OAS Model Regulation, Article 13, section 1. As discussed
below, the OAS Model Regulations also require mandatory reporting of certain levels of cash transac-
tions.
45. A discussion of bank crime, that is, of such offenses as bank fraud, check kiting, and mail
and wire fraud, is outside the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that in some nations,
including the United States, regulated financial institutions are required to refer to authorities all
suspected crimes that may cause loss to the institution, as well as money laundering offenses (which
may or may not cause an institution loss, as opposed to assisting in the criminal enterprise of someone
else).
46. FATF Report, Section II(C)(3).
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wholly voluntary, because a bank's internal compliance programs and the atten-
tion it pays to barring the use of its facilities by criminal organizations are likely
to affect significantly the outcome of an investigation or prosecution of the bank
itself on a money laundering charge.47
The efficacy of a mandatory reporting system, on the other hand, depends on
the source and enforcement of the requirement that transactions be reported. The
strongest argument for mandatory reporting is that a regulatory system is a better
mechanism than criminal statutes to deal with certain aspects of the money laun-
dering problem. Provided the authorities are capable of reviewing and analyzing
the information reported, mandatory reporting may constitute the most effective
source of investigative leads available concerning some types of organized crimi-
nal activity. Moreover, a mandatory reporting requirement becomes an element
of review in bank examinations and recognizes the link between money laundering
and the safety and soundness of the organizations involved.
Whether reporting is voluntary or mandatory, attention must be given to the
consequences of reporting in situations in which the reporting bank is not involved
in wrongdoing. The consequences that need to be addressed fall generally into
two categories: protection for the bank against liability to its customers, and the
steps the bank is required to take, once it determines that a transaction is potentially
suspicious.
(d) Protection Against Liability to Customers
Article 9 of the EC Directive makes clear the importance of protecting banks
against claims that their disclosure of potentially suspicious transactions renders
them liable for violation of financial privacy or other rules governing bank-
customer relationships :48
The disclosure in good faith to the authorities responsible for combating money laun-
dering by an employee or director of a credit or financial institution of information
[that may indicate money laundering or that is requested by authorities in response to
a report of potentially suspicious transactions] shall not constitute a breach of any
47. No suggestion is intended that authorities would pick out uncooperative institutions for prose-
cution. Rather, because any institution can act only through its personnel, a charge that the institution
itself fostered a climate in which assistance to criminal organizations was either encouraged or
knowingly tolerated, rather than simply unknowingly sheltering within its halls a rogue individual
who sought to shield his activities both from bank officials and the authorities, is likely to depend
upon the steps the bank generally took to prevent its facilities from being so used. Those steps include,
most importantly, education and compliance programs, as well as reporting of transactions prior to
the challenged event. In other words, the culture of the institution is itself likely to constitute proof
of its institutional culpability or innocence in a money laundering prosecution.
48. The substance of the rules that might be violated by referrals of suspicious transactions to
law enforcement authorities will depend upon the details of the legal system of the nation involved.
In the United States, for example, referrals might violate both federal financial privacy and state
privacy and trade statutes, if those statues did not provide exceptions for such referrals. The recently
enacted Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 expands and codifies the protection
afforded American financial institutions that report suspicious transactions, whether voluntarily or
pursuant to regulatory or statutory mandates.
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restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative,
regulatory or administrative provision, and shall not involve the . . . institution, its
directors or employees in liability of any kind.49
The language of the OAS Model Regulations is in some respects more sweep-
ing. o Both provisions reflect Recommendation 16 of the FATF Report, which
suggests that, so long as the disclosure of facts relating to a potentially suspicious
transaction is made in good faith, the protection of the reporting institution from
liability should exist "even if [the institution] did not know precisely what the
underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actu-
ally occurred." 5 ' The American banking industry maintains that protection from
customer liability will increase the willingness and ability of banks to cooperate
with law enforcement authorities by eliminating considerable confusion about
the consequences of cooperation, and its position is reflected in recent enactment
of broad protection from civil liability for institutions that report suspicious trans-
52actions.
(e) Activities Following Reporting of Suspicious Transactions
Recommendations 17-19 of the FATF Report, Articles 7 and 8 of the EC
Directive, and Article 13, section 3, of the OAS Model Regulations address the
steps an institution should be required to take following its initial identification
and, if required, report of a potentially suspicious transaction. First, the institution
and its staff should keep the matter highly confidential and take no steps to alert
the bank's customers that they are the objects of suspicion or that a report has
been made with respect to their activities.53 (Obviously, the same issues arise
when a bank becomes aware of law enforcement interest because it receives an
49. EC Directive, Article 9.
50. See OAS Model Regulations, Article 13, section 4:
When the report [of transactions that could constitute or be related to illicit activities] is made in good faith, the
financial institutions and their employees, staff, directors, owners or other representatives as authorized by law,
shall be exempted from criminal, civil and/or administrative liability, as the case may be, for complying with
[the reporting rule] or for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any
legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, regardless of the result of the communication.
51. FATF Report, Section UI(C)(3) (Recommendation 16). The question of liability to customers
is different from the question of whether an institution that reports a suspicious transaction that later
is found to lead back to employees of the institution may find itself liable for the conduct that it
initially reported, or, conversely, whether reporting a transaction in good faith in which the bank
later turns out to have been involved, confers some protection against prosecution. The answer to
that question is largely fact-based and not capable of a statutory answer. Of course, reporting of
such activity should be taken into account in deciding whether to prosecute the institution in the first
place.
52. New 31 U.S.C. section 5318(g)(3), added to the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act in late 1992, provides
that:
Any financial institution that makes a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regulation or a disclosure
[of a suspicious transaction] .... and any director, officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall not be
liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States or any constitution, law, or regulation of
any State or political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for any failure to notify the person involved in
the transaction or any other person of such disclosure.
53. See FATF Report, Section HII(C)(3) (Recommendation 17); EC Directive, Article 8; OAS
Model Regulation, Article 13, Section 3. The OAS Model Regulations, which would permit notifica-
tion of "other person[s] authorized by law," is slightly ambiguous in this regard.
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inquiry from law enforcement authorities or when it becomes aware, "even in
an informal way," 5 4 that a customer's account may be the subject of action by
authorities.)
The question whether the institution should go ahead with the suspect transac-
tion is even more difficult to answer categorically. Generally, institutions should
follow the instructions of authorities, which may include an order not to complete
the transaction in countries in which the relationship between law enforcement
authorities and financial institutions requires contemporaneous reporting and au-
thorities are empowered to bar transactions." (In some cases, the authorities
might either request or order an institution to complete the transaction for the
same reason.) 56
In nations in which no reporting is required, the FATF Report, following the
lead of the Basle Statement, recommends that an institution that makes no report
"should deny assistance to [the suspect] customer, sever relations with him and
close his accounts." 57 Whether a decision so to act is an excuse for failure to
make a voluntary report or in fact is counterproductive because of the notice it
gives to those who have been identified as potentially suspicious, raises a complex
set of legal, administrative, and ethical questions that are beyond the scope of
this paper.
3. MANDATORY REPORTING OF CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS
The second level of interest is a statutory requirement that banks report all
transactions above a certain threshold in cash (or other essentially bearer media,
such as travelers checks, whose use and conversion to economic value does not
generate a paper trail through the financial system). The most commonly discussed
requirement is that all transactions in cash above a certain level be reported
to Treasury authorities in a manner that requires recordation, verification, and
reporting not only of the fact of the transaction, but of the name of the institution
through which it passes, the identity of the transacting party, and related informa-
tion.5s
Some of the potential benefits of such a system are obvious. While money
laundering is not restricted to cash movements, certain targeted transactions,
especially the movement of funds from narcotics sales, generate primarily cash
54. See FATF Report, Section III(C)(3).
55. Ideally, no action would be taken in any event until the authorities have time to react to the
information with which they have been supplied, but the EC Directive recognizes that such delay
may both be impossible and in some cases counterproductive, because it would amount to notification
to money launderers that their operations had fallen under suspicion, so that ultimately a delay might
make apprehension more, rather than less, difficult.
56. See EC Directive, Article 7.
57. FATF Report, Section III(C)(3) (Recommendation 19).
58. As a sample of the sorts of information required, see the United States Treasury's Currency
Transaction Report (Internal Revenue Service Form 4789, or "CTR").
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proceeds. Mandatory reporting provides authorities with a grid of such transac-
tions and creates a level of protection against the failure of institutions, either
unwittingly or intentionally, to report potentially suspicious transactions. A cur-
rency transaction reporting regime is somewhat easier to enforce than a regime
that depends on prosecution for the more serious and complex crime of money
laundering; proof that an institution willingly failed to report cash transactions
is far easier than proof that it did so knowing that it was dealing with the proceeds
of illegal activity in an attempt, or with an intent, to assist in the commission
of that activity. Moreover, such a reporting regime, which raises the risks of
detection based on the attempt to pass cash through the system, may deter criminal
operators from using banks and drive such operators into less effective means
of money laundering.
At the same time, a mandatory currency transaction reporting system raises
obvious problems. First, such a system depends for its efficacy on the ability of a
society to identify a level at which cash transactions become sufficiently inherently
suspicious to justify reporting. In the United States, for example, it is relatively
rare for individuals to transact business with an institution above the reporting
level of $10,000 in cash; such transactions are not unheard of, although they are
far from the norm. 59 But some societies are simply more cash-based than others;
the more a country's legitimate commerce is conducted in cash the more difficult
it becomes to identify a level at which a cash transaction becomes suspicious.
60
(The reporting regimes that do exist provide exemptions for cash transactions
by recognized cash intensive businesses, such as grocery stores, that are regular
customers of the institution involved. The problems with exemption systems are,
again, too technical for this paper.)
Second, reporting schemes will generate a large amount of perfectly innocent
information, as well as information indicative of either money laundering, tax
evasion, or both. That information must be protected from misuse.
Third, mandatory reporting places difficult cost burdens on the institutions
that are required to report, and there is an open debate whether the benefits of
receipt of the information by the authorities justifies the cost. While reporting
rules are in theory somewhat more simple to enforce than money laundering
statutes, enforcement of reporting rules raises its own knotty legal and operational
issues, for both prosecutors and bankers, when persons appear to be attempting
to evade reporting requirements by passing cash into institutions in a series of
59. The same is generally true of businesses, except for certain cash intensive consumer busi-
nesses, such as food stores. Of course, all societies do not rely on credit cards or other cash substitutes
to the extent that such substitutes are relied upon in the United States.
60. The FATF Report recognizes this fact when it recommends that "countries should further
encourage in general the development of modem and secure techniques of money management,
including increased use of checks, payment cards, direct deposit of salary checks, and book entry
recording of securities, as a means to encourage the replacement of cash transfers." FATF Report,
Section 1I(C)(5) (Recommendation 25).
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related transactions each of which, taken by itself, is just below the reporting
thresholds. In addition, there is no area in which the dichotomy between bank
regulation and the regulation of other financial intermediaries raises such prob-
lems as in the case of cash reporting. The costs of cash reporting by banks are
difficult to justify to the extent that similar, more costly enforcement efforts, are
not aimed at other financial intermediaries.
The efficacy of reporting depends on the ability and willingness of law enforce-
ment authorities to use the information generated by the reports. In the U.S.,
for example, the Internal Revenue and Customs Services maintain the information
generated by such reports in electronic information systems that are available to
investigating agents; the Treasury has created a special agency, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), a key part of whose mission is the
development of advanced computer systems to evaluate, link, and analyze the
cash transaction information. Australia, the other major nation to have adopted
a cash reporting regime, has created a similar, national, law enforcement organi-
zation, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, or
"AUSTRAC."
In addition, a system for the reporting of cash transactions within national
borders must be combined with a requirement of similar reporting of cash move-
ments at a country's border to be maximally effective. The FATF has noted that:
the phenomenon of cross-border shipments of illegal-source currency, usually directed
towards financial institutions in non-FATF countries and non-bank financial institutions
both within and outside FATF countries, is on the increase. 6'
The FATF believes that international bank-to-bank transfers, whether within
the same multinational institution or between institutions, are worthy of special
attention. 62
Finally, the institution of cash reporting is no substitute for the other steps
discussed above. Not all money laundering depends upon cash movements (espe-
cially in nations that are transit countries rather than large scale narcotics produc-
ers or consumers), and it is simply unclear whether the other serious crimes
at which money laundering enforcement efforts are directed depend on cash
transactions to such a degree as to justify the costs of reporting.
The FATF Report is worth quoting at some length in this regard because of
the summary it provides of the currency reporting issue. The Financial Action
Task Force agreed that:
countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks and other
financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international
currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a computer-
ized data base, available to competent authorities for use in money laundering cases,
subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information. 63
61. FATF Annual Report, 1991-92, Paragraph 59.
62. Id., at Paragraph 60.
63. FATF Report, Section III(C)(5) (Recommendation 24).
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The Recommendation, however, is preceded by a balanced presentation of the
problems with a reporting solution:
[T]he efficiency of such a system ... is uncertain. The majority of the group was not
convinced of the cost effectiveness of this system at this time, and expressed fears that
it could lead financial institutions to feel less responsible for the fight against money
laundering. On the other hand, it is the view of a few members that a comprehensive
program to combat money laundering must include such a currency reporting system
together with the reporting of international transportation of currency and currency
equivalent instruments.6
As indicated above, the members referred to include both the United States and
Australia, and U.S. Treasury policy strongly supports the evolution of a workable
currency reporting system as part of the international money laundering regime.
4. THE PROBLEM OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
At several places above, the paper has alluded to the special problems raised
for money laundering control by non-bank financial institutions. A number
of institutions other than banks, some formal and some informal, can offer
persons seeking to place tainted funds with the opportunity to do so, either
because of such institutions' links to banks or because of their independent
links with financial institutions in other countries. The list includes securities
dealers, insurance companies, casinos and other gambling establishments
(which traditionally offer a range of financial services to their customers),
currency exchange houses, and so-called money transmitters-establishments
that wire funds for (usually small or impecunious) customers to other areas.
The FATF, which has come increasingly to recognize the centrality of the
movement of funds through non-bank institutions to the problem of effective
money laundering control, has offered the following useful typology to distin-
guish types of non-bank institutions:
1-[O]rganizations whose prime function is to provide a form of financial
service but which, at least in some FATF member countries, fall outside
the scope of the regulated financial sector. For example, bureaux de change,
cheque cashers and money transmission services, including those provided
through correspondent relationships outside the formal banking sector.
2-Organizations whose primary purpose is to offer some form of gambling
activity. For example: casinos, lotteries and various games of chance.
3-Organizations whose primary function is to buy and sell high value items.
For example: precious metal and gem dealers, auction houses, real estate
agents; automobile, aeroplane and boat dealers.
64. FATF Report, Section III(C)(5). The EC Directive contains no discussion of mandatory
cash reporting; the OAS Model Regulations require record-keeping of cash transactions by institutions,
and permit, but do not require, "competent authorities" within signatory nations to require reporting
to the extent they see fit. See OAS Model Regulations, Article 12, Section 7.
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4-Professionals who, in the course of providing their professional services,
offer, in some countries, client account facilities. For example: lawyers,
accountants, notaries and certain travel agents.65
Of course, like banks, such institutions serve a variety of legitimate purposes
and their growth reflects a market need. But a portion of that market can easily
become-and in developed nations is almost certainly-illegitimate.
It is not hard to recognize the non-bank financial institution issue, nor is it
difficult to deal superficially with the problem. Thus, the definition of "credit
and finance institutions" to which the EC Directive applies includes not only
banks, but also, with some idiosyncratic exceptions, investment banks, securities
dealers, foreign exchanges, credit card and travel check issuers, leasing contrac-
tors, casinos, auction houses, and certain providers of professional services. Both
the FATF Report and the EC Directive recognize that their respective principles
cannot be effective if applied only to institutions directly involved.6 6 The United
States requires reporting of cash transactions in excess of $10,000 not only by
financial institutions, but also by any other person who receives such funds in
the course of a trade or business, including, for example, merchants, providers
of services, and professionals.67
The real problem is administrative. Whatever problems bank secrecy regimes
or particular institutions have posed for law enforcement, banking concerns are
generally linked with one another and government by a system of bank examina-
tion and regulation that makes uniform action and supervision in connection with
money laundering control possible. Securities dealers and insurance companies
are regulated, but often not to the same degree as banks, while less traditional
forms of intermediation, such as currency exchange houses or money transmitters,
may be subject to no effective regulation whatsoever. In this context, it makes
sense to rank institutions as "highly-regulated," "less-regulated," and "unregu-
lated," and attempts to impose any regulatory scheme on the latter class of
institutions have proved very difficult. As a consequence, unified regulatory or
supervisory action against non-bank institutions becomes difficult at best.68
Money launderers can also make use in many cases of sellers of large-ticket
items such as automobiles, computers, boats, and aircraft, or sellers of marketable
items such as metals, art, or even rugs. In the former situation, criminally derived
65. FATF Annual Report, 1990-1991, at page 12.
66. See FATF Report, Section III(C)(6) (Recommendation 27); and EC Directive, Article 12.
67. See 26 U.S.C. section 60501 (1992). Section 60501, unlike the general cash transaction
reporting rules described above, is a part of the U.S. income tax laws.
68. In the U.S., the situation is further complicated because many non-bank institutions, such
as currency exchanges or money transmitters, are generally regulated, if at all, at a state or local,
rather than a federal level. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 gives the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury authority to issue regulations requiring counter-money laundering programs
(and setting minimum standards for such programs) in both bank and, importantly, non-bank financial
institutions. See Title XV of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. Law
102-550 (October 28, 1992), Section 1517(b).
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funds are simply converted to capital assets for use in the operation of a continuing
enterprise or for personal consumption. No system of control is likely totally to
shut off avenues such as these, and attempts to come to grips with this aspect
of the money laundering problem are just beginning.
V. Enforcement Issues
If money laundering control requires a degree of self-examination and concen-
tration by financial institutions, it requires the same degree of administrative
reordering by law enforcement officials, both domestically and internationally.
The details of such cooperation, like the details of bank compliance systems, are
beyond the scope of a concept paper, but several aspects of the required reordering
should be noted.
1. DOMESTIC INFORMATION SHARING AND COOPERATION
A nation's enforcement system must emphasize interaction between various
enforcement authorities, and among civil administrators, prosecutors, police,
and the financial community, to attempt successfully to implement whatever
statutory tools government obtains to deal with money laundering. Thus, informa-
tion exchange and joint investigations between customs, tax, and narcotics offi-
cials, often produce the most effective pictures of criminal money laundering
organizations. A lead developed or information received in the course of a tax
audit may indicate activity that should be the subject of a referral to money
laundering investigators, and, conversely, money laundering investigators may
uncover complex export fraud or tax schemes.
The placement of primary responsibility for oversight of counter-money laun-
dering programs, analysis of relevant reports of suspicious transactions and cur-
rency movement information, and enforcement of laws against money laundering
must reflect the statutes a country enacts. A strong argument can be made that
the regulatory and investigative aspects of money laundering control should be
centered in a nation's Treasury authorities, in a special branch of its police, or
in its banking authorities, depending on the facts of a particular country's general
organization, but whatever the placement, cooperation between the elements is
critical.
2. FORFEITURE
A key component of anti-money laundering laws around the world is legislation
providing for the forfeiture of assets and goods which are derived from either
the underlying predicate offense(s) or the money laundering itself. Although there
is ongoing debate about the way asset forfeiture should work, especially about
the extent to which forfeiture proceedings should be treated as criminal or civil
proceedings, there is widespread agreement that effective control over money
laundering is impossible without some type of asset forfeiture program.
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Both the Council of Europe Convention and the U.N. Convention specifically
direct their signatory nations to adopt asset forfeiture laws. Though limited some-
what by a provision allowing the member nations to declare specific categories
of offenses to which it should apply, the Council of Europe Convention includes
a very broad confiscation provision. Substituting the definitions themselves in
the place of terms defined elsewhere in the Convention, Chapter II, Article 2 of
the Convention directs each party to adopt measures at the national level to enable
it to confiscate:
[(i)] any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to
commit a criminal offense or criminal offenses, [(ii)] any economic advantage from
criminal offenses, including property of any description, whether corporeal or incorpo-
real, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to,
or interest in such property, or [(iii)] property the value of which corresponds to such
proceeds [i.e., "economic advantage . . . "].
Moreover, the Council of Europe Convention further directs the member states
to adopt measures necessary to support such an asset forfeiture regime, namely:
special investigative techniques facilitating the identification and tracing of proceeds
and the gathering of evidence related thereto. Such techniques may include monitoring
orders, observation, interception of telecommunications, access to computer systems
and orders to produce specific documents. 69
The U.N. Convention also contains comprehensive forfeiture provisions. Un-
der Article 3, which defines offenses and sanctions, each party is directed to
legislate sanctions, including fines and confiscation, for the commission of a
range of narcotics trafficking and money laundering offenses.7 ° Then, under
Article 5, the Convention directs its members to adopt measures, consistent with
their domestic laws, sufficient to enable (1) confiscation of proceeds derived
from and instrumentalities used in narcotics and money laundering offenses; (2)
identification, tracing and seizure of such proceeds and instrumentalities; (3)
acquisition or seizure of bank records; and (4) cooperation with requests from
foreign governments vis 6 vis similar prosecutions or confiscation.71
As further evidence of widespread international agreement on the need for
asset forfeiture legislation, the preamble of the EC Directive provides that member
states "should, within the meaning of their legislation, extend the effects of the
Directive to include the proceeds of [criminal] activities, to the extent that they
are likely to result in laundering operations . However, none of the articles
in the Directive itself deal with forfeiture.
In the case of a seizure related to a narcotics offense, the government may
seize any funds and objects of value, within the jurisdiction of the seizing author-
ity, which are furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for controlled
69. See Council of Europe Convention, Chapter II, Articles 3 and 4.
70. See U.N. Convention, Article 3, Section 4(a).
71. Id., Article 5, Sections 1-4.
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substances, as well as all objects or funds traceable to or intended to facilitate
such exchanges.12 Thus, in addition to the contents of bank accounts, the govern-
ment may seize automobiles, airplanes, boats, weapons, buildings, and other
property used in "facilitating" the manufacture, importation, distribution, and
sale of the narcotics, as well as proceeds from the sale of any such property. It
is in this connection that a government's ability to trace the movement of funds
(and, thus, the overall efficacy of the anti-money laundering scheme) becomes
crucial to its successful implementation of a given asset forfeiture statute. If the
criminal is able to disguise the true derivation, ownership, or location of given
assets, those assets cannot be traced to the underlying predicate offense, and thus
cannot be seized. Accordingly, sufficient reporting and record keeping require-
ments are an essential, if indirect, component of an effective asset forfeiture
mechanism.
Substantively, of course, governments differ as to which types of criminal
activity they choose to designate as predicates justifying asset forfeiture and in
the extent to which they have refined particular doctrines concerning the tracing
of assets to illegal activities. In the United States, the list is virtually identical
to the list of crimes which serve as predicates for the money laundering offense
(with the notable addition of money laundering itself as a predicate for asset
forfeiture) ."
Perhaps the single most notable, and draconian, feature of currently enacted
forfeiture regimes is the extent to which those regimes deem the tainted proceeds,
property or instrumentalities to belong to the government instantaneously upon
the occurrence of the crime.74 This feature of such legislation is based upon the
ancient legal fiction that "it is the property which has committed the wrong." 75
Accordingly, under most forfeiture regimes, the burden of proof regarding the
lawful origin of proceeds or property allegedly subject to forfeiture is placed, not
76
on the government, but on the putative owner of the allegedly tainted property.
72. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Section 981(a)(1)(B) (1992).
73. See supra part 11. 1.
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Section 981(0 (1992); 21 U.S.C. Section 811(h) (1992) ("All right,
title, and interest in property [seized] . . . shall vest in the United States upon commission of the
act giving rise to forfeiture under this section").
75. Manufactures International, Ltd v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 792 F. Supp. 180,
184 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing U.S. v. One Mercedes-Benz 380 SEL VIN # WDBCA 33AIBB10331,
604 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). At least in the jurisprudence of England and the United
States, the present day concept of asset forfeiture can be traced to the English law concept of a
"deodand," whereby the dagger used to stab a person to death was forfeited to the Crown to be
applied to pious uses and distributed in alms-a practice having both legal and religious significance.
See 2 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law 473-74 (2nd ed.
1968); Exodus 21:29 (cited in Manufactures, supra, 792 F. Supp. at 180); Black's Law Dictionary
(6th ed.), p. 436.
76. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. section 1615; Regulations for Expedited Administrative Forfeiture
Procedures, Section 6079 of Pub. L. No. 100-690 [uncodified]; U.N. Convention, Article 5, Section
7 (encouraging member parties to adopt such a reversal of the ordinary burden of proof in asset
forfeiture cases). Cf. 21 U.S.C. section 881(d) (probable cause constitutes a prima facie case for
FALL 1994
862 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
However, the United States Supreme Court has recently reminded law enforce-
ment authorities that the fictional forfeiture doctrine can be taken too far and
should not be used to cut off the rights of innocent third parties having interests
in the seized property."
Other procedural features of forfeiture statutes include provisions for the or-
derly seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, condemnation and disposition
of property and proceeds, remission or mitigation of such forfeitures, and the
compromise of claims. Of course, the primary challenge in drafting such provi-
sions is to ensure that the government is evenhanded and accountable in its asser-
tion of rights to and its disposition of seized assets. In the United States, the
Supreme Court has recently affirmed the right of third parties to make a claim
of rights in seized property arising after the commission of the asserted offense
and before the seizure-provided those claimants can prove to have had no knowl-
edge of the property's derivation from illegal activities or the proceeds of such
activities-and is currently considering the extent to which a seizure is void if
the value of the property seized far exceeds the amount involved in the offense
on which the seizure is purportedly based. Finally, of course, the possibility of
forfeiture should not in and of itself be perceived to be (and should certainly
not be) the primary reason for beginning an investigation or making a seizure.
Efficiency in enforcement, and in depriving those involved in criminal activity
of the proceeds thereof, must to some extent give way to these more general
"due process" concerns.
A particular country's forfeiture rules are likely to reflect the general tenor of
its legal system's property concepts and historical experience, but those building
blocks generally require statutory codification before they can be efficiently or
fairly involved in modem law enforcement situations. Thus, for example, when
the United States Congress enacted asset forfeiture legislation in 1986, it simply
borrowed rules from the customs laws and from admiralty and maritime law. In
addition, U.S. asset forfeiture statutes provide for the conversion of seized assets
to cash, and then for subsequent distribution of the proceeds to state, federal, and
local law enforcement agencies in amounts based at least in part on the various
agencies' respective participation in the investigations leading to the seizures.
3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Money laundering is in some ways the paradigm international crime. Given
the ease and speed with which funds can now be transferred electronically across
international borders, international cooperation in the fight against money laun-
the forfeiture of drug proceeds). Section 6079(b) provides, in part, for the administrative return of
seized property to a defendant if, inter alia, the owner establishes both a valid, good faith interest
in the seized property and that he or she at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that the
property was being used or would be used in a violation of the law.
77. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 61 U.S.L.W. 4189 (Feb. 24, 1993).
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dering has become imperative to the efficacy of that fight on any particular national
battleground. The dependence of national law enforcement authorities on one
another is easily understood, given the multinational nature of modem criminal
organizations. But the need for cooperation goes well beyond particular investiga-
tions. One nation's money laundering control measures can be effectively mini-
mized or negated by inaction on the part of other nations to which funds can
flow. Thus, the FATF recognizes that:
Geographical zones where money laundering schemes develop, or might develop, are,
in some cases, well-known and, in any case, can be characterized by some criteria.
Such criteria include the lack of any legal requirement for institutions or professions
to maintain records for the identification of their clients or the transactions performed,
the absence of a legal permission for law enforcement authorities to have access to
these records, and the impossibility for them of communicating these records to law
enforcement authorities of other countries.78
Coordination includes not only policy but technical adjustments to conform
systems of different nations to one another. Differing degrees of criminalization,
for example, or different definitions or principles of enterprise liability or scienter,
may hinder the operation of mutual legal exchange agreements, even among
countries wishing completely to cooperate with one another, and such considera-
tions must be taken into account in drafting national counter-money laundering
statutes.
Finally, the multinational nature of modem financial enterprise raises its own
problems. Authorities have noted the potential significance in money laundering
schemes of intrabank transfers between nations with different laws or transfers
from companies to their subsidiaries or affiliates. A particular country needs to
be familiar not only with its own rules, but with the rules of other jurisdictions
that charter or regulate institutions that operate in that country. We understand
that a great many German banks operate within Bulgaria's borders, and we there-
fore would expect Bulgarian authorities to pay special attention to the rules adopted
in Germany.
For all of these reasons several major international and regional initiatives
have begun the work toward reaching agreement regarding how best to deal with
the problems of money laundering. The Vienna Convention, signed by more
than 100 countries, contains comprehensive money laundering and asset forfeiture
rules and establishes a basis for placing international controls on money laun-
dering. Signatories to the Convention must make money laundering a criminal
and extraditable offense, have pledged to eliminate any legislative barriers (such
as bank secrecy laws) to cooperation on investigations, and facilitate the identifica-
tion, tracing, seizure, and forfeiture of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and
money laundering.
The FATF report encourages countries to enter into a network of bilateral and
78. FATF Annual Report, 1990-1991, at 13.
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multilateral agreements using generally shared legal concepts to provide practical
measures to implement the widest possible range of mutual assistance, and the
FATF has continued to work toward that end. 79 It has at present a five-year term,
and has set for itself four ongoing tasks:
* assessment of implementation of the FATF recommendations by member
countries;
* coordination and oversight of efforts to encourage nonmembers to adopt
and implement the FATF recommendations;
* making further recommendations and evaluations and considering develop-
ments in money laundering techniques; and
* facilitating cooperation where appropriate between particular organizations
concerned with combatting money laundering and between individual coun-
tries.80
Recently, as part of its program, the FATF has conducted counter-money laun-
dering programs in both Budapest and Warsaw and has met with representatives
of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.8 '
VI. Financial Privacy
1. RECORD KEEPING AND REPORTING SYSTEM
A system of required record keeping and reporting of customer information
by financial institutions is a crucial element of most counter-money laundering,
and, for that matter, effective tax administration regimes. At the same time, the
details of such a system and the manner in which it operates must reflect individual
privacy rights at all levels.
Several notions seem paramount. These are:
* The assumption that private records are private, unless the legislature prop-
erly has designated certain transactions as inherently suspect to require re-
porting.
79. The membership of the FATF now includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Cooperation
Council, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States. In addition, observers include the Customs Cooperation Council, the International Monetary
Fund, INTERPOL, and the United Nations International Drug Control Program, the Council of
Europe, and the Investment Bank for Recovery and Development (the "World Bank").
80. FATF Annual Report, 1990-91, at 3.
81. In a related development, INTERPOL has also adopted model legislation and a series of
resolutions on money laundering. Its model legislation provides, inter alia, for the temporary freezing
of property prior to the filing of criminal charges; the issuance of restraining orders, injunctions
and other orders for the seizure of property allegedly derived from criminal activity; and the forfeiture
of property to the government of the country where the property is located, upon a conviction for
possession of criminal proceeds. Resolutions adopted by INTERPOL in June 1988, November 1988,
and April 1989, urge nations to record large currency transactions and share the data with domestic
and foreign law enforcement agencies.
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* More detailed access to records requires some judicial process designed to
assure that citizens' legitimate privacy interests are considered.
" Records may be used, once obtained, only for the specific law enforcement
purpose for which they were obtained and do not become generally available
to government for all manner of purposes.
" Records must be retained by financial institutions so that they are available
if the demands of due process are satisfied.
" Financial privacy concepts do not apply to the obligation to report criminal
or potentially suspicious activity and financial institutions cannot be sanc-
tioned for making such reports in good faith.
2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Each nation has struggled to reach an appropriate balance between privacy
and enforcement considerations, and it seems clear that the balance can never
be struck once for all time. Rather, the balance requires constant examination
as ways of doing business, record keeping and retrieval systems, and the methods
of fraudulent transfers all evolve.
3. U.S. EXPERIENCE
The experience of the United States provides one example of a system geared
to balance privacy and enforcement considerations. The 1970s saw the enactment
in the United States of two comprehensive privacy statutes that build on the
fundamental American tradition, reflected in the Fourth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, of protecting citizens against unreasonable searches or seizures without
judicial process. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. section 552a, generally
restricts the federal government's use of records identifying individual citizens,
even though the information has been lawfully gathered by the government for
a particular purpose. Financial privacy legislation was enacted four years after
the general Privacy Act, in reaction to an unsuccessful constitutional challenge
to the U.S. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, popularly called
the "Bank Secrecy Act."
The enactment of the Privacy Act in 1974 clearly reflected the concern of the
U.S. Congress that the advent of the so-called information age warranted explicit
protection of U.S. citizens' privacy interests in records maintained by the govern-
ment. However, in U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), after upholding the
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act's record keeping and reporting scheme,
the United States Supreme Court held that an individual had no standing under
the Constitution to challenge on constitutional grounds a bank's disclosure of his
records to the government, because the individual did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of records maintained by and for business
purposes. The legislative response to Miller was the enactment of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. section 3401, et seq. ("RFPA"). As the name
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of the statute implies, this law protects only financial information; this limitation
is indicative of the approach to privacy protection on a subject by subject basis
in the United States. 2
The Right to Financial Privacy Act is an expression of congressional intent
to provide individuals (not corporations or partnerships of greater than five mem-
bers) with a legitimate expectation of privacy in financial records maintained by
private financial institutions. RFPA does not prohibit the transfer of financial
information to the federal government; 3 rather, the statute imposes procedural
and notice requirements on the government designed to protect the individual's
right to privacy in his financial information.
RFPA provides that the government shall not have access to the financial
records of any customer maintained by a financial institution unless the records are
obtained with the customer's consent or through specified process. The processes
through which such records can be obtained are (i) administrative subpoena, (ii)
search warrant, (iii) judicial subpoena, or (iv) formal written request that includes,
among other requirements, a certification that the request is relevant to a law
enforcement inquiry and that a copy of the request has been mailed to the cus-
tomer. 8
In cases in which the government obtains records through process rather than
through consent, the customer is entitled to receive notice that his records have
been transferred to the government, except in certain legislatively sanctioned
cases.8 5 If the government believes that investigative or other law enforcement
82. In addition to the Privacy Act and RFPA, other statutes are designed to: (i) restrict the
interception of electronic (including telephone) communications (see Title I of the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, codified at 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521
(1992)); (ii) protect the contents of stored electronic communications (such as the contents of records
stored by commercial computer services) (see Title 11 of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, supra, at 18 U.S.C. Sections 2701-2710 (1992)); (iii) limit the effect on personal privacy of
governmental data matching (see the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-503, codified at 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(o)-(v) (1992)); (iv) restrict private sector employer
use of lie detector ("polygraph") tests (see the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-347, codified at 29 U.S.C. Sections 2001-2009 (1992)); (v) protect against unauthorized
electronic access to bank accounts (see the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321,
codified at 15 U.S.C. Sections 1693, 1693a-1693r (1992)); (vi) prohibit unauthorized access to
computer systems (see Title II, Section 2102(a) of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. Section 1030 (1992)); and (vii) protect the
privacy of cable television subscribers (see the Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, codified at 47 U.S.C. Sections 551 et seq. (1992)).
83. RFPA does not extend to transfers of information to private entities or, in the federal system
that prevails in the U.S., state or local governments.
84. See 12 U.S.C. Section 3402 (1992).
85. One overriding exception to the notice requirements relates to records received through grand
jury subpoena. Section 3413(i) states that, with some exceptions, the provisions of the Act do not
apply to records requested pursuant to a federal grand jury subpoena, meaning that customer notice
is not required (in fact, the court may require the financial institution not to notify the customer).
However, the leniency of this provision is tempered in part by restrictions on subsequent use of
records obtained in this manner. Records obtained via the grand jury generally can be used only to
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concerns mandate nondisclosure, the government must petition a court to request
a delay of notice and make a showing of the adverse effect arising from premature
notice. RFPA also specifies how information, once legitimately obtained, may
be used. The overall scheme prohibits uninhibited transfers among various agen-
cies of the central government, while attempting to accommodate law enforcement
needs. Thus, records may be transferred between agencies where the transferee
agency certifies that the "records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry within the jurisdiction of the receiving agency or department.-1
6
An agency of the federal government that receives a record covered by the
Act is required to account for its use and disclosure. Transfer to a second agency
again triggers customer notice requirements in most instances. Records may
however be transferred to the Department of Justice or the Department of the
Treasury (without notice to the customer) if such records are relevant to the
investigation or prosecution of a particular crime.8 7
RFPA does recognize, however, that unrestricted government access to finan-
cial information may be appropriate only in certain instances. Thus, to the extent
that a financial institution regulatory agency is exercising its supervisory authority
with respect to a financial institution under its jurisdiction (for example, where
the Treasury's Office of Thrift Supervision is engaging in regulatory action with
respect to a savings and loan association), this agency is not bound by the terms
of RFPA. This is true also for the Treasury Department in its capacity as adminis-
trator and enforcer of the Bank Secrecy Act, the principle reporting and record
keeping statute.
VII. Ancillary Considerations
The true novelty of money laundering, whether viewed as a criminal offense
or as an economic activity, is the extent to which it integrates, and in so doing
confounds, the purposes, instruments, and institutions of both antisocial and
highly social activity. Because money laundering involves a criminal use of a
nation's financial and trading systems, it is almost impossible to discuss money
laundering control in a vacuum. The way a country decides to deal with money
laundering both reflects and depends upon the nature of its systems of fiscal
regulation and upon certain features of its general legal system. The FATF Recom-
mendations recognize that their implementation will require changes to the legal
systems of all nations; but changes in legal principles are only one aspect of the
design and implementation of a comprehensive approach to money laundering
in the context of a particular nation.
consider whether to issue an indictment and must be destroyed or returned to the financial institution
thereafter. Furthermore, not even descriptions of such records may be maintained unless the record
has been used in the prosecution of an indicted crime.
86. 12 U.S.C. Section 3412 (1992).
87. Id.
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1. TAX ADMINISTRATION
The basic system of fiscal interaction between a nation and its citizenry is its
tax system or systems, which often set the standard for the sorts of records citizens
and businesses are required to keep. Conversely, a key goal of money laundering
is to avoid the identification of the ownership or control of assets that tax declara-
tions or examinations can trigger; a related goal is simple avoidance of tax pay-
ments.
Tax compliance systems are also relevant. To the extent that financial interme-
diaries such as banks, insurance companies, and securities dealers are required
to report to tax administrators about interest and dividend payments to citizens
in aid of the equitable administration of a national tax system, those intermediaries
are more likely to have in place internal control systems that can also be used,
without additional high marginal costs, to combat money laundering.
2. BANKING REGULATION
As discussed above, a system that relies only upon prosecutions to enforce
strictures against money laundering is likely to be ineffective. But the ability of
government, prosecutors, and the financial services industries to cooperate, while
maintaining their separate spheres of activity, in combatting money laundering
will depend, not surprisingly, on the ways in which such industries are licensed
and regulated in other areas.8" While there may be no one preferred model for
such cooperation or for money laundering control systems, a money laundering
statute that does not take account of the regulatory terrain in which it must take
root is not likely to prove effective. In addition, general regulatory oversight,
for example in preventing the acquisition of financial institutions by those with
criminal histories or connections, is necessarily linked to more specific counter-
money laundering measures.
3. CUSTOMS REGULATION
Although a great deal of money laundering, especially highly publicized cases,
involves complex financial transactions carried out through electronic media, an
equally significant portion of the offense involves old-fashioned smuggling-the
movement of cash in bulk without declaration across national borders. Thus, any
comprehensive attack on money laundering must consider physical as well as
notional cross-border transfers. s9
88. The EC Directive recognizes the uses of such a system when it requires member states to
ensure that bank inspectors disclose to law enforcement authorities information discovered in the
course of bank inspections that "could constitute evidence of money laundering." EC Directive,
Article 10.
89. For example, the FATF has expressed concern about the extent to which "currency is
converted into gems, precious metals, or currency equivalent monetary instruments" to facilitate
cross-border transfers of illicitly derived monies. FATF Annual Report, 1991-1992, at Paragraph
59.
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4. CURRENCY CONTROL
The ability of a country to serve as an efficient channel for money laundering
depends upon the ability of persons holding "launderable" funds to convert those
funds freely into and out of the country's currency. Funds derived from illegal
activities such as narcotics sales, arms dealing, or financial fraud, must be capable
of transfer to other jurisdictions if they are to escape permanently a country's
systems of law enforcement and taxation. If the country is used as a way station
for movement of funds derived from illegal activities in other countries, the funds
must be capable of conversion into and out of the country's currency, and that
currency must retain a relatively stable value vis 6 vis the currencies of other
nations. (The profit margins involved in illegal activities may of course make
the owners of funds derived from those activities relatively indifferent with respect
to swings in currency value that would discourage less hardy legitimate investors.)
5. GENERAL REGULATORY AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
Much of what is said immediately below concerning a nation's legal system
also relates to the evolution of its general business practices. Thus, the sorts of
record keeping and reporting rules noted above as part of money laundering
enforcement systems presuppose general familiarity with and acceptance of tech-
niques of record keeping, financial statements, and the need for accurate reflection
of the results of business activity. Those techniques are essential for efficient
management of enterprises of all but the most primitive sort.
6. GENERAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Money laundering statutes combine prohibitions against knowing participation in
the movement or investment of cash derived from illegal activities with rules that
potentially hold business enterprises liable for the acts of their employees and agents.
A great deal thus depends upon the general rules of the country's legal system
involving the degree of knowledge required for criminal liability and the extent to
which a master can be deemed liable for the acts of his or her servant. While the
general legal system's rules need not control, since money laundering is a relatively
new offense, a set of money laundering statutes that does not reflect, even as it
advances, the legal system of which it will become a part faces a difficult task.
Finally, money laundering control requires, as separately discussed above, a
constant balancing between the needs of a society for fiscal control and the needs
of a society for personal privacy. There is no fixed formula for such balancing, but
the considerations involved are likely to reflect some of the deepest assumptions of
the legal system of the nation involved. 90
90. The observations of the FATF's Working Group III (International Relations) are apposite:
Other states, particularly some in Central and Eastern Europe, are developing wholly new financial sectors within
industrial economies. These are countries whose basic needs extend beyond assistance in combating money laun-
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VIII. Money Laundering and Economic Change in Bulgaria
We understand that Bulgarian Treasury and Central Bank officials are espe-
cially concerned about the misappropriation of value from newly privatized enter-
prises or from enterprises created with state subsidies, during the period of the
transformation of the Bulgarian economy. The question naturally arises about
the extent to which a counter-money laundering regime will curtail or assist in
prosecution of such activity. The question is not surprising, because, as two
American journalists who have studied the Russian experience recently noted,
"the illegal flow of money out of [that] country testifies to the immaturity of
the Russian financial system, which has not only been unable to enforce its own
laws on tax collection and currency transactions, but also is inconsistent in its
rules." 9 ' It is difficult to supply a categorical answer to that question, but several
factors militate against positive expectations. First, money laundering statutes
depend for their operation on the identification of predicate crimes. The crimes
can extend to various kinds of fraud, as indicated above, but experience with
the use of money laundering statutes to deal with that sort of sophisticated criminal
activity is limited. Moreover, to the extent that authorities wish to concentrate
on intermediaries-to send a message that an intermediary that assists in the
misappropriation of national assets is subject to severe penalties-money laun-
dering statutes will present problems of proof that may be far more difficult than
in the case of receipt of large amounts of cash from anonymous and seemingly
impecunious customers.
At the same time, however, the instinct that money laundering and misappropri-
ation of value during the conversion of state enterprises to private ownership
have something in common is a valid one. Money laundering control ultimately
involves the accounting, internal audit, and institutional awareness issues that
also arise in the case of other sophisticated financial crimes; overweening bank
secrecy laws can prevent enforcement of rules against theft as well as they can
prevent enforcement of rules against narcotics trafficking or money laundering.
Money laundering statutes need not be the only statutes that require record keep-
ing, specialized reporting, and particularized enforcement regimes, and it does
appear that the same sorts of considerations that go into a money laundering
control program would have relevance for prevention of financial fraud against
dering, and where FATF activity is likely to form part of a wider operation to develop and safeguard the financial
sector. A key problem is how to develop supervisory and regulatory systems against a background of mistrust
of state interference of any sort. Furthermore, the convertibility of domestic currencies provides new routes for
money laundering, and the opening of borders allows increased flows of cash across borders. So assistance for
these countries must cover banking supervision and customs controls to combat illicit activities, as well as basic
training and new legislation.
Report of FATF Working Group III, Part II, paragraph 6, printed in Annexes to FATF Annual
Report, 1991-1992, at 14.
91. See Celestine Bohlen, "Russia is Bleeding Billions in Wealth," The New York Times, Febru-
ary 1, 1993, A-1, A-6. The subject is also discussed in a series of three articles titled "The Profits
of Chaos," by Michael Dobbs and Steve Coll, that appeared in The Washington Post, on January
31, February 1, and February 2, 1993.
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government enterprises, as they do in the case of investigations for customs or
tax fraud. 92
Nations whose legal systems are more developed in terms of the application
of legal rules to free economies may have other ways, based on long-standing
concepts, to deal with financial institutions who assist in fraud-for example
criminal conspiracy, organized crime, public corruption, or tax fraud statutes.
Legal systems do not develop overnight, and a nation whose legal system lacked
the basic concepts necessary to prosecute such fraud or theft directly might be
able to transplant the necessary concepts on a temporary basis by enacting a
comprehensive money laundering statute, especially to the extent that one sought
to create a choke point against transmission of funds out of a country through
its financial institutions. However, it is not likely that such a statute would serve
in the long run as an efficient or just substitute for the development of organic
criminal and civil regulatory measures necessary to deal comprehensively with
the problem. And misapplication of such a statute could throw unnecessary imped-
iments in the way of the development of healthy economic institutions in the
private sector without producing any counterbalancing gains in law enforcement.93
IX. Conclusion
The considerations discussed above are numerous and not always easy to har-
monize, either with one another or with the situation of the nation to which they
are sought to be applied. We hope that this paper has, as we said at the beginning,
adequately presented the considerations sufficiently to permit Bulgarian officials
to consider the specific issues they face. In that spirit, we can not do better than
to close with another observation of the Financial Action Task Force:
At present, the central and eastern European region is not one of the most significant
centers of money laundering. However, as the economies of these countries become more
integrated into the world financial system and their currencies move to convertibility, they
will become attractive to money launderers. At the same time, the reform and restructuring
of the Eastern European financial sector presents an ideal opportunity for these states to
take measures that would help them to protect themselves against money laundering. 9'
We are pleased to have been asked to assist Bulgaria in such efforts.
92. Indeed, in most advanced societies, it is the income tax enforcement laws, not the money
laundering laws, that impose a general requirement on the citizenry to maintain books and records
adequate to substantiate claims of tax liability or nonliability based on a particular picture of one's
assets and their derivation.
93. Thus, Dobbs and Coll comment in The Washington Post, that, despite the evidence of rampant
corruption and economic dislocation that they identify in Russia, -[A] tough crackdown against
'gray and black' international trading, as it is known in Russia, risks snuffing out the very entrepreneur-
ial ambitions and instincts for profit that are the life's blood of any vital market economy .. "
Dobbs and Coil, "The Profits of Chaos," in The Washington Post, January 31, 1993, at A24. One
may appreciate the difficulties implied by the statement without believing that such views are an
excuse for canceling any particular investigation or policy.
94. FATF Annual Report, 1991-1992, paragraph 90.
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